Abstract: The Brazilian domestic debt has posed two challenges to policy-makers: it has grown very fast and its maturity is extremely short. This has prompted fears that a default or a compulsory lengthening scheme would be imposed. Here, we analyze the domestic public debt management experience in Brazil, searching for policy prescriptions for the next few years. After briefly reviewing the recent domestic public debt history, we decompose the large rise in federal bonded debt during 1995-1998, searching for its macroeconomic causes. The main culprits are the extremely high interest payments--which were caused by the weak fiscal stance and the quasi-fixed exchange-rate regime, and the accumulation of assets of doubtful value, much of which may have to be written off in the future. Simulation exercises of the net debt path for the near future underscore the importance of a tighter fiscal stance to prevent the debt-GDP ratio from growing further. Given the need to quickly lengthen the debt maturity, our main policy advice is to foster and rely more on, inflation-linked bonds.
Executive Summary
During the 1995 to 1998 period, the net public debt of the consolidated public sector in Brazil increased from 28.5 percent to 42.6 percent of GDP. This dramatic growth has raised many doubts about the sustainability of the current economic policy in the country. These concerns have been further increased by the exchange rate devaluation of January of 1999, which raised even more the stock of the domestic public debt--due to the existence of dollar-linked indexation clauses on part of the debt--, as well as the stock (in R$) of the foreign debt. The concerns about sustainability have been compounded by those related to the very short maturity of the domestic public debt, which increased the vulnerability of the country In this paper we assess the experience with public debt management in Brazil in recent years, attempting to evaluate its main lessons and derive policy guidelines for the next few years, with emphasis on the issues pertaining to the structure of the debt (denomination, indexation and maturity). We review in Section II the genesis of the modern domestic public debt market in Brazil. After being conceived in the second-half of the sixties as a non-inflationary instrument of public finance, and based, initially, entirely on inflationlinked bonds, the public debt market expanded substantially in its early years, generating for a while a seemingly costless way to fund public expenditures. During the 1980s, with the rise in inflation, cash management activities became predominant in the debt market. Since then, the maturity of the public debt has been remarkably short. With inflation stabilization, the debt has been gradually lengthened while nominal bonds became more prevalent, even when total debt was growing fast due to fiscal deficits. The international financial crises since 1997 changed that trend in the debt structure. As of October, 1999, the share of nominal bonds is only 11.55%, while the average remaining life of the debt is still very short.
Section III decomposes the large rise in federal bonded debt during 1995-1998, searching for its macroeconomic causes. It attempts to quantify the contraction and expansion sources of the rapid increase in the stock of federal bonded debt occurred during the period. The main culprits are the weak fiscal stance, and the very high interest rates and associate payments. In Section IV we perform simulation exercises of the public net debt path until 2002, the final year of the current presidential term. We show that even under favorable macroeconomic conditions the evolution of the public net debt to GDP ratio will remain a policy concern in coming years. Policy conclusions are summarized in Section V, where we discuss the role of public debt management in Brazil in the near future. Our main policy advice is that the rollover of the domestic public debt should be made with inflationindexed bonds, in order to lengthen the maturity without creating time consistency problems. We add a few suggestions on how this shift could be accomplished.
I. Introduction 1
From 1995 through 1998, the net public debt of the consolidated public sector in Brazil increased from 28.5 percent to 42.6 percent of GDP. This dramatic growth has raised many doubts about the sustainability of the current economic policy in the country. These concerns have been further increased by the exchange rate devaluation of January of 1999, which raised even more the stock of the domestic public debt, due to the existence of dollar-linked indexation clauses on part of the debt, as well as the stock of the foreign debt (in R$). The concerns about sustainability have been compounded by those related to the very short maturity of the domestic public debt.
In this paper we assess the experience with public debt management in Brazil in recent years, attempting to evaluate its main lessons and derive policy guidelines for the next few years, emphasizing the issues related to the structure of the debt. Section II discusses the evolution of the domestic bonded public debt since 1970, with an emphasis on volume and composition (indexation and maturity) during the Real Plan. Section III decomposes the large growth observed in the federal bonded debt during 1995-1998, searching for its macroeconomic causes. It attempts to quantify the contraction and expansion sources of the rapid increase in the stock of federal bonded debt that occurred during the period. In Section IV, we simulate paths of the net public debt until 2002, the final year of the current presidential term. We show that even under favorable macroeconomic conditions the evolution of the public net debt to GDP ratio will remain a policy concern in coming years. 1 We acknowledge the World Bank's initiative in commissioning and financially supporting this study. All views in the papers are those of the authors. We thank Suman Berry, Clemente del Valle, Xin Zhang, and Eriko Togo for comments and Áureo de Paula, Debora Masullo, Marcelo Rezende, Roberto Cohen and Tatiana Didier for superb research assistance. All errors are ours.
With the previous sections as background, Section V concludes the paper with a policy analysis of public debt management in Brazil in the near future. Our main policy advice is that the rollover of the domestic public debt should employ inflation-indexed bonds, in order to lengthen the maturity without creating time consistency problems.
II. Domestic Bonded Debt 2

II.1. Historical background (1970-1994)
The beginning of the existing market for domestic public debt in Brazil was the financial reforms introduced by the military government in the second half of the 1960s. Those reforms envisaged three big measures to solve the inflationary problem of the previous ten years (inflation rose from 15% to 80% a year between 1955 and 1964) : the creation of marketable public securities to finance fiscal deficits; the creation of the Central Bank; and the adoption of a banking system with a clear-cut separation between commercial banks and non-bank institutions.
Figure II.1-Federal Bonds: 1970 -1999 -displays the evolution of the total federal government debt, separating the Central Bank holdings of government debt from the outstanding debt held by the private sector. During the high inflation years--from the early eighties to the mid-nineties--there had been a widening of the fraction of the public debt held by the Central Bank. Under high inflation, cash management activities tended to predominate in the banking sector and the Central Bank backing of such activities required the automatic provision of liquidity to banks' holdings of public debt. This situation stood in marked contrast with the stated objectives of the reforms. Nevertheless, the objective of institutional development of a market for government debt, which had been stated in the financial reforms of 1964-5, had been attained.
The domestic public debt market in Brazil started with indexed bonds in the late sixties.
Only in August, 1970, nominal During the infancy of the public domestic debt market (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) , the demand for public debt grew ahead of the government's financial needs. A large stock of public domestic debt was deemed convenient for regulating short-run liquidity of the banking system, by means of final sales and purchases of public debt in the open market. As in "Say's law", however, the possibility of creating a large debt supply opened room for the creation, in the Central Bank, of a wide range of credit programs designed to fund agricultural projects and regional development, and has fostered the establishment of regional development banks at the state level. The excess demand for public bonds in the early years of the market led the Central Bank to assume the role of a financing agent, 4 an aberration that lasted for years.
The development strategy of the 1970s was based in great measure on the public sector's ability to issue debt to fund development projects.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, it became clear that this growth engine had stalled. The decade witnessed high and unstable inflation, which led to a considerable increase in the volatility of the expected returns on government debt due both to a decline in the use of public savings and to frequent changes in monetary correction rules (i.e., partial disguised defaults). The 1980s were called the lost decade, due to the economic stagnation, the megainflation, and the decline in public, as well as private, investment. As a consequence, the accumulation of public debt seemed to be approaching the end, and, by the turn of the decade, a default on domestic public debt was seen by many as an unavoidable outcome.
In fact, the new government that took office in 1990 decreed the blocking of 80% of all financial assets. The terms of the decree were actually complied with, and the government was able to unblock all the financial assets beginning17 months later, in 12 monthly installments. During 1993-4, capital inflows added to the demand for high-yield public debt, creating a more stable environment that made the Real Plan possible.
II.2. Recent Evolution: The Real Plan
In July 1994, a new currency, the Real, was introduced, as the last part of the de-indexation program. Both the debt structure and size changed in important ways after the monetary reform, as the annual inflation rate fell from a four-digit figure to a one-digit figure. Until the Asian crisis (October, 1997), foreign capital kept flowing in steadily, and the domestic public debt market experienced a period of gradual maturity lengthening due to decreasing yield volatilities. After the last quarter of 1997, a series of ups and downs has characterized the international finance scene for the emerging markets, 5 also affecting the domestic public debt market. After a semester when more than US$45 billion of foreign reserves vanished, the Brazilian government decided to float the Real in January, 1999, thereby inaugurating a new phase of the Plan. We analyze below the debt accumulation process since the introduction of the new currency, the Real, emphasizing debt size and structure (indexation and maturity).
II.2.1. Size
The extremely fast increase of the federal bonded debt during the Real Plan was one of the more ominous macroeconomic indicators. Figure II .3 displays the evolution of the federal bonded debt in constant R$ of April, 1999, and as percent of GDP. It is quite clear that, after remaining stable during the first year of the new currency (July-94 to June-95), both measures of debt accumulation started trending upward. As a ratio percent of GDP, the federal bonded debt almost quadrupled in less than four years! Section III identifies the factors responsible for this enormous growth.
II.2.2. Composition
This section analyzes the structure of the domestic debt, i.e., its composition: denomination of the debt (domestic currency vs. foreign currency), indexation (to domestic price levels, to the exchange rate, to short-term interest rates, etc.), and maturity structure. We also explore new measures of risk exposure, as the V@R (Value-at-Risk).
II.2.2.1. Denomination and Indexation
All domestic federal bonded debt is redeemable only in R$. Only the external debt is redeemable in foreign currency. Figure II .4 displays the federal debt composition after the Real Plan. It is clear that when the debt started trending upwards in mid-1995, it was the nominal (non-indexed) part that was mainly responsible for the growth. Notwithstanding the increasing share of nominal in total debt, average maturity kept lengthening. Barcinski
[1997] computed a measure of risk usually applied to financial institutions portfolios the V@R (Value-at-Risk) for the nominal federal debt. The V@R measures the amount of market risk of a given portfolio, i.e., the maximum expected loss of that portfolio in a given time span. 6 He showed that, notwithstanding the increase in the nominal debt and its maturity lengthening, the V@R of the nominal debt actually decreased for the first years of the Real Plan (he analyzed 1994-1996) . That reflected the fact that interest rate volatility was decreasing substantially, except for the first semester of 1995, when it increased momentarily as a consequence of the Mexican crisis. This fall in interest rate volatility is displayed in Figure II .5. 5 Since 1997, all first semesters have been good ones, and all second semesters have been bad ones for the emerging markets. It is a general hope that the spell will be broken this year. 6 For a detailed description of the V@R methodology, see Jorion [1997] . 7 Adapted from Barcinski [1997] . Figure II .4 shows the average maturity of the debt during the Real plan. The average maturity of the total debt has substantially increased in relative terms although it remains quite low in absolute terms. 13 As already commented above, it is nonetheless interesting that until the Asian crisis (September, 1997), maturity kept increasing despite the increasing share (and total value) of the nominal debt. 14 As noted before, until 1996, Barcinski [1997] showed that, the V@R (value-at-risk) of the nominal debt decreased despite the size increase and the maturity lengthening. In other words, investors in public debt were not incurring more price risk, despite the increase in the portfolio size and in the nominal debt maturity.
With the international financial crises, this virtuous circle came to an end. When Brazil began to suffer the contagion effect of the Asian crisis, in the form of a speculative attack during the week of October 27, 1997, the Central Bank quickly reacted by increasing the basic interest rate, the TBC, from 20.70% to 43.41% (see Figure II .6). After two weeks without public debt auctions, the rolling over continued with three-month-maturity bonds, at rates little below the TBC.
In that environment, the there may be no equilibrium with such a high interest rate and long maturity. 15 The only equilibrium may be the one with very short maturity bonds. An alternative explanation is that the maturity premium asked by the market for longer maturity bonds was beyond the maximum premium implied by the auction managers' reservation prices. 16 That rollover strategy had the effect of decreasing the maturity of the stock of debt. Figure II .6 shows that interest rate volatilities increased tenfold during this turbulent period. As a consequence, so did the V@R measures.
Until the end of 1997, only three-month maturity bonds were placed, all with negative maturity premia. During the first five months of 1998, the Treasury and the Central Bank were able to place nominal debt with increasing maturity. However, when the Russian crisis first hit in May, 1998, even short-term bonds (three or six months) became extremely costly for the issuers, as yields rose substantially. As a consequence, the market for threemonth, six-month and one-year bonds vanished, and the only nominal bond placed in the auctions after mid-May were one-month BBC's (a nominal bond issued by the Central Bank). In June and July, even that became too expensive, and the Central Bank resorted to its last resource, the zero-duration bond.
This decision had an immediate impact on the amounts that were rolled over in each auction. When the debt maturity decreases, the debt must be rolled over more often. That is exactly what was happening until May, 1998. The amounts of monthly redeemed and issued debt tripled! This, of course, created a new source of risk, that of not being able to roll over the debt in the event of a crisis, with possible impacts in the exchange-rate anchor that was in place at the time. After May, due to the strategy of placing only indexed bonds (mostly zero-duration and dollar-linked), average maturity resumed its upward trend, and the rollover risk decreased. However, this happened at a cost: if interest rates had to be lifted in the future, the fiscal budget would be badly hit. The same was valid regarding a devaluation. With the benefit of hindsight, we know now that both strategies caused massive losses to the fiscal budget.
Even with zero-duration debt, average maturity fell again in the last quarter of 1998, due to the contagion effect of the Russian default. After the devaluation, maturity has been increasing (see Figure II .4). However, if the government were now to decide to quickly change the current debt structure in favor of nominal debt, either a fall in maturity or a substantial cost increase in debt service would be likely, as we will discuss in Section V.
III. Evolution of the Gross Domestic Bonded Debt during the Real Plan: a Decomposition Exercise
During the four years of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's first term, the federal bonded debt increased to more than five times its original value; from R$ 60 billion to R$ 323 billion. 17 This spectacular debt growth raises many doubts about the sustainability of economic policy, especially if one considers the effects of the exchange-rate devaluation in January of 1999, which increased even more the service costs of federal bonded debt, due to the existence of dollar-linked indexation clauses on part of the debt.
This Section decomposes the federal bonded debt growth, searching for the macroeconomic causes of the huge growth that occurred in 1995-1998. We attempt to quantify the contraction and expansion sources of the federal bonded debt.
Consider the federal government and Central Bank aggregate balance sheets in 12/31/94 and 12/31/98, respectively. One of the accounts on the liability side is the federal bonded debt. The value we are interested in explaining is the difference between this account's balances on these two dates. Due to accounting identities, this value is the sum (with opposite sign) of the differences during the period of all the other accounts' balances.
Consequently, by aggregating these other accounts' balances in a way amenable to our macroeconomic analysis, we measure the factors responsible for the growth of the federal bonded debt in this four-year period. The idea of this decomposition exercise can be better understood with the accounting framework provided in Table III.1. The table starts from the government budget constraint, and works to develop an accounting identity (equation (6)) that is amenable to identifying the sources of the growth of federal bonded debt. (1) NET DEBT = LIABILITIES -ASSETS (4), (5) 
Thus, we search for an explanation for the R$262,369 variation, as shown on Table III .2, of the federal bonded debt (federal government + Central Bank). 2) To accumulate foreign and domestic assets; and 3) To repay other previous debts (non-bonded debt).
Item #1 represents the difference in the two net worth figures (a fiscal deficit is a loss, and a fiscal surplus is a profit); item #2, the asset accumulation during the period; and item #3, the decrease in the aggregate of all other liability accounts. Thus, considering the federal bonded debt as the "sources", and the other accounts as the "uses" we can observe these uses on Table III .3 and III.4, expressed in R$ and percentage of GDP, respectively.
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18 Here, we are not determining whether the debt movements resulted from the fiscal, monetary, or exchange rate policy. 19 The total of the uses (in bold on 
262,369
In percent of GDP, the data above are: Table III .3 shows the federal bonded debt variation. The greatest share of the increases in federal bonded debt was due to the federal deficit (which would be equal to the net debt variation, if it were not for accounting details discussed above). The accumulation of assets was responsible for a little bit less, 62.5% of the federal bonded debt growth. The increase in other debts was responsible for the (negative) residual factor (-25.5%), which means that if the other debts had not grown by R$ 66,933, the federal bonded debt would have increased even more. Measured as a share percent of GDP, the federal deficit was responsible for 54.2% of federal bonded debt growth of 24.15% of GDP (Table III.4 ). The accumulation of assets was responsible for 40.7% of the federal bonded debt growth, while the other debts actually decreased as a percent of GDP, being responsible for the remaining 5.0% of the federal bonded debt growth. 20 We now turn to the decomposition of each of these three factors: the federal deficit, the assets accumulation, and the repayment of other debts.
III.1 Financing of the federal government (+ Central Bank) deficit
In order to make the net debt variation of the period (R$165,422 or 13.1% of the GDP) compatible with the nominal deficits registered during the same period, it is necessary to make three adjustments. The first is to add the states', municipalities' and state-owned enterprises' net debt variation.
The second adjustment recognizes the privatization revenues. Since privatization revenues occur only once; they are not included in the public deficit computation. Nevertheless, they are public revenues which, ceteris paribus, would lower the net debt (the state-owned enterprises that were sold were not previously included in the public sector assets). Keeping the hypothesis that everything else stayed constant, and assuming that all the privatization revenues were used for public debt redemption, the gross debt would diminish by the exact amount of these privatization revenues. Therefore, we have to add these revenues to the variation of the total net debt in order to obtain the debt variation concept that best conforms to the public deficit statistics. Table III .3, all figures are in R$, while in Table III .4, the figures are in percent of GDP. Therefore, given that nominal GDP grew during the four-year period, the fact that "Other Debts" increased in nominal terms, while they decreased as percent of GDP is an indication that the increases occurred more to the end of the period relatively to the decreases. 21 In reality, the relation between privatization and public debt is much more complex for at least two reasons. The first is that when a state-owned enterprise is sold, its debts are transferred to the private sector, diminishing the net debt by a value greater than the revenue of the privatization. The second reason is that
The third adjustment is related to the "Balance Sheet adjustment". 22 The idea of this adjustment is that the macroeconomic impacts of the "skeletons" (old debts that were eventually repaid) occurred in the past. For example, the public debt issue for Banco do Brasil's recapitalization -whose accumulated losses were threatening its solvencyrecognized losses derived from bad credit expansions in the past. Indeed, the debt issue was not related to deficits during the recapitalization period, but to old deficits, that had never been recognized until then. Thus, it is necessary to subtract the Balance Sheet adjustment's variation from the total net debt to obtain the debt variation concept comparable to the public deficit, namely, the "Net Fiscal Debt without Privatization".
Therefore, the following accounting identity should hold: for the fiscal statistics published by the Brazilian Central Bank.
Increase in Net Fiscal Debt without Privatization = Nominal Deficit.
Making the adjustments, we obtain: some state-owned enterprises held public debt as part of their assets. This debt, apparently was part of the gross debt, but, since it belonged to a state owned enterprise, was not part of the net debt. After the privatization, it also became part of the net debt. Therefore the study of the relation between privatization and the public debt is still a work in progress. 22 Footnote n o 1 of Table XXI of Nota para Imprensa (Monetary) of Banco Central do Brasil defines the "Balance Sheet Adjustment"as the following: "(basis: Dec/95) Computes the bond issues relative to the Banco do Brasil's recapitalization, the reduction of the investment on the monetary reserve fund due to the court ruling involving the liquidation of the banks Comind and Auxiliar, securitization of debts, the use of "privatization money" in the PND, renegotiation of the Itaipu and Eletronorte debts with the SFN, the inclusion of constitution funds, besides the foreign debt difference, due to balance conversions, end of period exchange rates and the flows by the monthly average rate." Table III .7 shows the evolution and the composition of the public deficit during 1995-8.
The net federal debt variation is slightly higher than the nominal deficits accumulated in the same period (226,645 -219,999 = R$6,646 
III.3 Repayment of other kinds of federal public debt
As shown on Table III .3, the other debts suffered, in nominal terms, a net increase.
Therefore, if the other debts had remained the same, the federal public debt would have increased even more in nominal terms. Table III .10 shows the other kinds of debt variation in this period. Once more, the domestic components growth is faster than the foreign one in progress.
(84.83% versus 41.96%). Among the domestic net debt components, the greatest share is due to the Monetary Base, responsible for 32.18% of the total net debt variation. 24 It is observed that the most important individual factor for debt growth was interest payments (44.8%), followed by the accumulation of the state's debt (33.0%). If we add these interest payments to the accumulation of domestic assets, the quality of which is uncertain, we can "explain" more than 99% of the debt growth in this 24 We preferred to present first the nominal values so that the total value to be explained was equal to that published by the Central Bank.
period. 25 Therefore, it is quite reasonable to identify the public debt growth with the deterioration of the fiscal position. A word of caution is necessary. One should not infer from the previous analysis that the bulk of the explosive growth in domestic bonded debt was due exclusively to the policy of extremely high interest rates, and that had the interest rates been lower, the bonded debt would not have exploded. Interest rates were high not only because of the Central Bank policy decisions, but mainly because the fiscal stance became increasingly lax as the first successes of the Real Plan appeared on the inflation front 26 . 25 See 26 One can decompose the high domestic interest rate along the lines of the covered interest parity condition, to get: domestic interest rate = foreign interest rate + forward exchange-rate premium + covered interest parity differential (country risk). While the crawling-peg-exchange-rate policy adopted in Brazil after April, 1995 created a wedge (the forward exchange-rate premium) that hovered around 10 percentage points, the country risk part had also been substantial. The country risk component was mainly determined by the perception of an unsustainable fiscal policy. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that, had the government abandoned earlier the crawling-peg policy to float the currency, interest rates would have fallen to international levels and the debt problem would have never existed. To make this counterfactual scenario plausible, a much stronger fiscal stance would have been show that the primary balance of the consolidated public sector deteriorated substantially during 1994-8.
required. And, if that were the case, interest rates would have been much lower even under the crawling-peg regime. 
IV. Challenges Ahead: Debt Evolution in the Post-Devaluation Period
In this section we perform simulations of the public net debt path to 2002, the final year of the current presidential term. The starting point for the derivation of the model used for the debt-dynamics simulations is the standard budget constraint of the consolidated public sector, which in the case of Brazil includes the central government, states and municipalities and public enterprises: It is useful to rewrite equation (1) is the inflation rate, n is the rate of growth of real GDP and ε is the rate of devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. Equation (5) may be used to simulate the path of the net domestic debt in Brazil over the medium term taking into account specific assumptions about the primary balance, inflation rate, rate of growth of real GDP, nominal exchange rate devaluation, domestic and foreign interest rates, and seignorage revenues. In addition, since the government intends to continue its privatization program, one needs to make assumptions about how that program will be implemented. Finally, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the government has hidden and contingent liabilities which will be recognized in coming years.
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The main assumptions for the baseline scenario (Scenario 1) are shown in Table IV In order to stress further the importance of the programmed primary surpluses for the stabilization of the net debt to GDP ratio over the medium term, a second scenario is considered in which there is a milder adjustment in the fiscal position of the consolidated public sector, perhaps because of delays in the implementation of fiscal reforms. Table   29 The inflation rate in the debt simulation exercises should be a proxy for the GDP deflator. Here it is measured by the average IGP-DI.
IV.3 presents the basic assumptions of this alternative scenario (Scenario 2). After increasing to 3.1 percent of GDP in 1999, the primary balance is assumed to decrease to 2 percent of GDP in 2000 and remain at this level thereafter. To put this number in perspective, a 2 percent of GDP surplus represents a much tighter fiscal stance for the consolidated public sector than what was observed during any year in the 1995-1998
period. With the weaker adjustment in the fiscal position, monetary policy is supposed to carry a larger share of the burden for keeping inflation low. It is assumed that the real interest rate 
V. Policy discussion
As the simulation results from the previous section indicate, even under very favorable macroeconomic conditions the evolution of the net debt to GDP ratio will remain a policy concern in coming years. Under these circumstances, what role should be played by public debt management in the near future?
We see public debt management as constrained by a fundamental policy consideration in the short-run. Although perceptions about the likelihood of a debt rollover crisis in Brazil have improved considerably since the January 1999 devaluation, the large stock of shortterm debt remains an important source of anxiety, especially on the part of foreign investors. Even if there are reasons to believe that such a concern is somewhat misplaced 31 , a practical implication of this fact is that the risk premium on Brazilian securities remains higher than what it would likely be if the same public sector borrowing requirements were financed with longer maturity debt. A central priority of debt management in the short and medium-run, therefore, should be to intensify efforts to lengthen the average maturity of the public debt. Furthermore, given the need to reduce the interest burden of the debt and increase the sustainability of the current fiscal stance, such maturity lengthening should naturally be implemented at the lowest possible cost.
What kind of debt instruments will be more appropriate under these conditions? It is expected that under the current IMF supported program the share of external and foreign exchange-indexed debt in the total public debt will be reduced gradually. Therefore, the process of debt maturity lengthening must be conducted through the issuance of domestic debt, either nominal or indexed.
What should be the relative shares of these instruments in debt placements? For the sake of clarity of the exposition, we partition the question of how much of each kind of debt should be issued in two layers. First, one should determine how much nominal against indexed debt should be issued. Second, among the several kinds of indexed debt, how much of each kind should be issued (zero-duration and inflation-linked). Although the determination of 31 See Bevilaqua and Garcia (1999) .
the debt structure is a multiple-choice allocation problem, the two-layered scheme is adequate for the Brazilian case, as we now explain.
To lengthen the average maturity of the debt requires the issuance of indexed debt, since long nominal debt (above two or three years) can only be issued at an abnormally high-risk premium. Therefore, the basic policy recommendation concerning the public debt structure for the Brazilian economy in coming months is to issue nominal debt with the highest possible maturity without creating an extremely upward sloping yield curve at the end. For the time nodes previously "conquered", issue the highest possible amounts that do not create "price-pressure" effects. For the bulk of the rollover and for the new additions to the debt stock, indexed debt should be issued, to lengthen the maturity structure as much as possible.
In terms of placement procedures, the authorities should announce the auctions as far in advance as possible 32 and avoid placing unexpected amounts of short-term securities in order to profit from the low maturity premia of the shorter maturities. Placing short-term debt because it is cheaper in an environment of lack of confidence jeopardizes the situation of the previous long-debt holders, because the short-debt holders have a liquidation option over those, and harms the debt market in the long run. It is akin to the issue of debt seniority: the short-term debt holders hold debt that is senior vis-à-vis the long-term debt holders, since the former will mature before the latter. Information regarding the process of debt lengthening must be well conveyed to the market, so that debt holders know in advance that they will be purchasing liquid instruments, and that the government will not "cheat" on them by placing shorter instruments in the future.
An important question remains on how much of each kind of indexed debt (zero-duration, inflation-linked, exchange-rate-linked, or another form as discussed below) should be issued. The exchange-rate-linked debt share, as already mentioned, must conform to the guidelines of the current IMF supported program. Given the current inflation targeting framework the use of zero-duration debt poses a version of the well-known time consistency problem. The over reliance on zero-duration debt, as in the current situation with almost 60% of total debt in this form, may reduce monetary policy credibility and commitment, because policy makers may become more exposed to choices and trade-offs between tight money policies to contain inflation and the budgetary impact of higher shortterm rates. Therefore, it is advisable to reduce the share of this kind of indexed debt in the total public sector debt.
Therefore, the remaining instrument to be used in the process of maturity lengthening is inflation-linked debt. The main objection to this kind of debt indexation is that it may have inflationary effects. Nevertheless, as Price (1997) The current share of inflation-linked debt is negligible. This was a result of a policy decision after the Real Plan, when debt managers-convinced that inflation-linked debt was inflationary by conveying to the market a lack of anti-inflationary commitment of the government-decided to phase it out. Our policy advice is to reverse that decision. It is reasonable to assume that there is a natural demand for such long-term-inflation-linked bonds from pension funds, insurance companies, and other market participants whose liabilities are both long-term and display high correlation to the price level. For these market participants, long-term-inflation-linked bonds constitute a hedge, and, therefore, may be sold at a lower yield (higher price).
35 33 Page 53. 34 Page 55. 35 In order to encourage discussion about the best transition strategy toward a higher share of long-terminflation-linked bonds, we list here a few ideas of financial engineering that were collected among market participants and add a few ideas of our own. One possible instrument is a bond that would pay the higher of two indices: the inflation index plus a real rate (defined ex-ante), or a percentage of the accrual of the daily interest rates (Selic) during the bond's life. In the auction, market participants would bid for the percentage of the accrual of the daily interest rates (the lower the percentage, the more likely to win). This "mongrel" bond could provide a natural transition between the current zero-duration bonds and the inflation-linked bonds. While the holders of the "mongrel" bonds would guarantee the natural hedge provided by inflation protection (plus the real rate), they would also retrieve an option to profit from the high interest rates. The gain for the government would be the decrease of the harm in the fiscal accounts posed by an increase in short-term interest rates, thereby alleviating the time consistency problem discussed before. Another similar "mongrel" bond could be constructed by adding options to a standard inflation-linked-bond (plus an ex-ante real rate) with maturity of several years. These options, to be exercised at the beginning of each year of the bond's maturity, would change the yield from inflation plus the real rate to a percentage of the accrual of the daily interest rates during the following year. I.e., every year the debt holder would decide ex ante which index would be used to compute the bond's return. As before, the percentage of the accrual of the daily interest rates would be defined in the auction. The expectation is that with the success of the plan, market participants would not exercise the options, thereby in fact migrating to inflation-linked bonds, and alleviating the fiscal, and the derived monetary policy, time consistency problems. Again, the possible benefit of these "mongrel" bonds would be to allow the maturity lengthening of the debt with the minimum possible fiscal cost and without generating time consistency problems for the inflation targeting framework.
Of course, as the Real Plan achieves its long-term goals of promoting growth in a low-inflation environment, the debt structure should naturally shift towards nominal debt, including long-term securities. However, since it would be infeasible to try to engineer this shift at present, we see the indexation to inflation as the least harmful way to lengthen the debt maturity. 
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